Indian and Tamil Nadu Politics
BJP's Future in Tamil Nadu: Opportunities and Pitfalls
TAMIL TRIBUNE, April 1998 (ID. 1998-04-02)
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l. Introduction
2. BJP's Rise to Power
3. Beyond the Next Five Years
4. BJP Enters Tamil Nadu with a Weak Card
5. Hot Button Issues of Tamil Nadu
5.1. The Hindi issue
5.2. Cauvery waters issue
5.3. Sri Lankan Tamils issue
6. An Unique Opportunity for BJP
7. What Can BJP Do?
8. In Summary
ABBREVIATIONS
AIADMK - All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
BJP - Bharatiya Janata Party
DMK - Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDMK - Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
PMK - Pattali Makkal Katchi
(NOTE: The author is not a Tamil but has lived and studied in Tamil Nadu for over twenty years.)
l. Introduction
Finally India has a truly different government after 50 years of independence. India was ruled by the Congress Party for most of these 50 years. Parts of the remaining years were under coalition governments that depended on the Congress Party for their survival, unable to make any policy decisions without the latter's consent. The remaining few years under Morarji Desai, Charan Singh and V.P. Singh were nothing different from Congress governments; after all these leaders split from the Congress Party not out of major policy differences but because of personality clashes with Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. So, only now, in 1998, a truly different party has come to power and we expect much from it.
2. BJP's Rise to Power
"Will the BJP-led government last the full five-year term" is the question in everyone's mind. In order to answer the question, one should look at the mode through which BJP has come to power.
Until a couple of years ago, BJP had very little presence outside of the Indian heartland. BJP realized that, in order to capture power at the center, it needed to expand outside of the heartland, especially into the south. This seemed to be a formidable task. Considered a Hindu fundamentalist party, it tried to use this identity to carve out a voter base in the south rather unsuccessfully. The Hindu fundamentalist identity did attract a small voter base but not enough to change the election outcome in no more than a few constituencies. This was exactly what happened in Tamilnadu in the 1996 elections; though it received sizable votes in a few constituencies, it was unable to win even in a single seat. Building on this base to win sizable parliamentary seats in the south would take time; many, many years of time. But BJP was in a hurry. It had seen the finishing line in the 1996 elections, only to be stopped just short of crossing it. It needed some seats in the south and it needed it now, not ten or fifteen years from now.
BJP made a wise choice and formed alliances with a wide range of regional parties around the country. What it was unable to achieve on its own strength, it achieved in alliance with the assorted regional parties that do not share BJP's values, principles and goals. The BJP-led government is as fragile as a house of cards; pull one card out, down comes the whole house.
3. Beyond the Next Five Years
Will the BJP government survive the full term of five years? Possibly, if Prime Minister Vajpayee tactfully balances the diverse needs of his regional allies, some of who have diametrically opposite goals. Take for example, Tamil Nadu's Jayalalitha and Karnataka's Hedge. These two states are quarrelling over Cauvery waters for decades. Any precipitous action by Vajpayee to satisfy one or the other would result in the withdrawal of support to the BJP government by the "losing" side.
This article is not about the next five years. It looks beyond that time frame.
BJP has to strengthen its own political base outside of the heartland and reduce its dependency on so many regional parties. As an "out-of-stater" who has lived in Tamil Nadu for a long time and has observed what kindles the passions of the Tamil people, I offer some ideas on how BJP could strengthen its base in Tamil Nadu.
4. BJP Enters Tamil Nadu with a Weak Card
Tamil Nadu is different from the rest of India. Tamils are deeply proud of their language and consider themselves different from the rest of India, at least the India north of the Vindhyas. This is not to say that they are less patriotic than the Bengalis, the Gujaratis or anyone else in the Indian Union. They consider any politician from outside of Tamil Nadu, especially those from the north, with some amount of suspicion. Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi earned their trust because of their Nehru family identity. None of the other Prime Ministers of recent years earned their trust or even their respect.
BJP enters Tamil Nadu with an added baggage. Congress Party has (or at least had until recent years) deep roots in Tamil Nadu. It had local leaders of great stature, the likes of late Mr. Kamaraj. Even today, the various factions of the Congress Party in Tamil Nadu ask for votes in the name of Kamaraj. Also, the Nehru family is (or at least was) well respected in Tamil Nadu and was a "vote-getter" for the Congress Party. BJP has none of these assets. So BJP is entering Tamil Nadu with a weak card. In order to bolster its strength, it needs to do something to endear itself to the Tamils, something that is dear and near to them.
5. Hot Button Issues of Tamil Nadu
What are the issues dear to Tamil Nadu voters?
1. The Hindi issue
2. Cauvery waters issue
3. Sri Lankan Tamils issue
5.1 The Hindi Issue
"Hindi imposition", as they see it, evokes the passions of virtually everyone in Tamil Nadu. Sure, more Tamils than ever are learning Hindi today, but they do it purely on a pocket-book consideration. Knowledge of Hindi may improve their employment opportunities, so they study Hindi grudgingly, hating every minute of it. They truly believe that Hindi is imposed on them. DMK and AIADMK evoke the anti-Hindi passions of the masses when their political fortunes are down and need a booster shot.
If the BJP government could make English the sole official language, thus removing "Hindi imposition", or make Tamil an official language in par with Hindi, there is no doubt that BJP will win a lions share of votes in future elections. But this is a losing proposition for BJP. Any party that touches the current supremacy of Hindi would lose heavily in the Hindi heartland. This is something BJP could not afford. One cannot make Tamil an official language to placate Tamil Nadu either. There will be negative reaction from every other non-Hindi state. Every state would want their language also made the official language and that is simply impractical.
In summary, there is nothing BJP can do vis-a-vis the Hindi issue.
5.2 Cauvery Waters Issue
Tamil Nadu and the neighboring Karnataka are quarreling about the sharing of Cauvery river waters for decades. Successive Congress governments and the United Front government have skillfully averted making any decisions; because whatever the decision be, it would earn the displeasure of the "losing" state. Any action by the BJP government would result in loss of votes in the "losing" state.
5.3 Sri Lankan Tamils Issue
Tamil Nadu and Sri Lankan Tamils (Yesterday):
We will discuss this issue in some detail because this writer sees this as the one issue that BJP could use to establish a firm foothold in Tamil Nadu, without any adverse effect elsewhere in India.
This writer has lived and studied in Tamil Nadu from school days all the way to postgraduate studies. The sufferings of Sri Lankan Tamils have great emotive impact in Tamil Nadu across party, caste and religious lines. Emotions were very high during the mid-1980s. Feelings of the people of Tamil Nadu were genuine; sufferings of the fellow Tamils just across the sea less than fifty files away truly touched them and they wanted to help. At that time, even the very poor Tamils contributed money, whatever little they could, to support the militant groups fighting the Sri Lankan army. Every major political party in Tamil Nadu came in support of the various militant groups, in part for selfish political gains banking on people's feelings, and in part out of genuine concern for the fellow Tamils suffering in Sri Lanka.
Introduction of the Indian army into Sri Lanka to put down the LTTE dampened feelings in Tamil Nadu because the immensely popular late M. G. Ramachandran publicly supported Rajiv Gandhi's introduction of the army into the Sri Lankan conflict, mostly out of political considerations. Karunanidhi, a distant second to Ramachandran at that time in popularity, was not very vocal in supporting the Sri Lankan Tamils either. In spite of a lack of political sponsorship from either Ramachandran's AIADMK or Karunanidhi's DMK, there was in Tamil Nadu an undercurrent of sympathy towards and admiration for the LTTE, which was fighting the Indian army bravely. Because there was no major Tamil leader to orchestrate these feelings they remained dormant and silent. We now know from the Interim Report of the Jain Commission that during the latter years of the Indian army in Sri Lanka, Karunanidhi quietly and secretly helped the LTTE. Not knowing Karunanidhi's activities, Jayalalitha was at that time criticizing Karunanidhi for not doing anything for the Sri Lankan Tamils. She also issued several statements supportive of the LTTE.
The silent undercurrent of sympathy in Tamil Nadu towards the Sri Lankan Tamils remained steady until the fateful day in May 1991 when former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated near Chennai (Madras) by a group of Sri Lankan Tamils with the help of a few local Tamils. All major political parties in Tamil Nadu hurried to disassociate themselves from the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Tamils. AIADMK and its then ally, the Congress Party, painted DMK as the supporters of the killers of Rajiv Gandhi, and DMK lost heavily in the 1991 election that followed soon after the assassination. However it would score a spectacular victory in the 1996 election; the stigma of its association with LTTE no longer mattered to the voters of Tamil Nadu.
Tamil Nadu and Sri Lankan Tamils (Today):
The absence today of a vocal outcry against the sufferings of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the form of public meetings and protest processions does not mean that Tamil Nadu had forgotten the Sri Lankan Tamils. This just means that there is no effort by either of the two major political parties, the DMK and the AIADMK, to act as a megaphone to vocalize the silent sympathy of the people of Tamil Nadu towards the fellow Tamils in Sri Lanka.
This writer has observed many sympathetic group discussions at Tamil Nadu university campuses when there was news of civilian casualties or news of rapes, tortures and murders of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Many still look at the LTTE with admiration in spite of the massive propaganda against it by the AIADMK, the Congress Party and the Indian government itself. Even when I pointedly ask my Tamil friends "Didn't the LTTE come here and assassinate Rajiv Gandhi?" they simply shrug it aside. They do not seem to condone it but neither do they seem to dwell on it.
6. An Unique Opportunity for BJP
What does all this discussion of the people of Tamil Nadu and their feelings about Sri Lankan Tamils have to do with BJP's future in Tamil Nadu? Simply put, BJP needs to do something important in Tamil Nadu if it wants to establish itself as a strong independent political force here. Otherwise it will always remain a junior partner in alliance with one or the other regional party here, having to put up with their temper tantrums and demands.
We have already established that there is nothing much BJP can do about two of the hot issues, namely, the Hindi issue and the Cauvery waters issue, without creating a negative backlash elsewhere in India.
The issue of Sri Lankan Tamils is something else. While BJP government's help to Sri Lankan Tamils would establish BJP as a "friend of the Tamils" squarely in Tamil Nadu, it has no negative impact anywhere in India. In fact, with proper publicity and propaganda, it could have a very positive effect among BJP's core supporters elsewhere in India also. Let me elaborate.
As we established earlier in this article, there is a reservoir of sympathy and support for Sri Lankan Tamils throughout Tamil Nadu. With the exception of BJP, no other major political party could tap into these feelings and convert them to votes. DMK is accused of helping the killers of Rajiv Gandhi in the past and it is scared of publicly supporting the Sri Lankan Tamil cause in any meaningful way. AIADMK is a prisoner of its own propaganda against DMK for its support of the LTTE and it simply cannot now be the first and only one to support the Sri Lankan Tamil cause in a meaningful way. AIADMK may be inclined to jump in if BJP were to help the Sri Lankan Tamils and try to take part of the credit. But AIADMK would not be the first to speak out forcefully for the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Congress Party is very much in the same position as the AIADMK, much more so. Every leader in the Congress Party is trying to please Sonia Gandhi and anyone coming out to help the Sri Lankan Tamils in a meaningful way will be called a traitor to the Nehru family by his or her opponents within the party. BJP is the only party with clean hands in this matter. Unlike the DMK, AIADMK or the Congress Party, it carries no baggage in this regard. It is free to act unfettered with any past actions on the Sri Lankan Tamils issue.
7. What Can BJP Do?
Wishy-washy statements like "we sympathize with the sufferings of the civilians" or "we are concerned about civilian casualties" will not do. The Congress Party, AIADMK and the DMK issue such statements periodically and the people of Tamil Nadu by now are used to these impotent words. In order to make a positive impact in Tamil Nadu, BJP has to do something significant and effective.
Publicize repeatedly in Tamil Nadu the civilian casualties due to Sri Lankan Air Force bombings, making it front page news in Tamil Nadu. Talk about Indian concern about the destruction of Hindu temples by these bombings, release a few photos of the destroyed temples, and make it front page news in Tamil Nadu and the rest of India. Simultaneously, "in secret", supply the Sri Lankan Tamils effective anti-aircraft missiles. "Leak" this supply when the news of the downing of Sri Lankan Air Force planes are front page news. This helps project BJP as a "friend of the Tamils" in Tamil Nadu and a "defender of Sri Lankan Hindus" in the rest of India.
Remember there are no Sinhala or Buddhist votes in India for BJP to be concerned with but there are millions of Tamil votes and Hindu votes to gain.
The only criticism will come from the Congress Party. DMK cannot criticize BJP for helping the Tamils against the Sinhalese army. AIADMK is a BJP ally. Even if it were not, it cannot criticize BJP for helping the fellow Tamils in Sri Lanka; it may have negative impact in Tamil Nadu. In fact, AIADMK will publicize the help by its ally, the BJP, and try to get some credit for itself. The other two BJP allies, PMK and MDMK, will be pleased by BJP action because these two parties have all along been in the front line supporting the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Tamil cause.
The fast-talking Subramaniam Swamy has no support in Tamil Nadu or, for that matter, anywjere in India. He was elected to parliament in the coat tails of Jayalalitha. Without the AIADMK support he would have lost the deposit in the election.
The only one to criticize BJP would be the Congress Party. It is already a spent force in Tamil Nadu (many of its candidates lost their deposits in the 1998 election) and any criticism of the Indian government helping the Sri Lankan Tamils will only further erode their position in Tamil Nadu. What will be the effect of its criticism in the rest of India? Outside of the Congress Party, is their much enthusiasm for the Nehru family? This writer does not see any negative anywhere in India. Instead a positive effect for protecting the Sri Lankan Hindus. According to my Tamil friends, over 300 Hindu Temples were destroyed by the Sri Lankan army and air force. Even if this were an exaggerated number and only 100 Hindu Temples were destroyed, that is too much.
Moreover, Congress Party has some weakness on this issue too. Following the publication of the Jain Commission Interim Report, it demanded that DMK be dropped from the United Front government because of the Report's criticism of DMK for helping LTTE in the past. This resulted in the fall of the government (because the Congress Party withdrew its support) and the 1998 elections. Failing to achieve a majority in the elections, the Congress Party was ready to accept DMK support to form a Congress Party government. How can it explain to the people this double take if it raises the Sri Lankan Tamil issue again?
8. In Summary
BJP needs to build its strength in the south in order to reduce its dependence on regional parties. There are opportunities and pitfalls in Tamil Nadu. "The Sri Lankan Tamil issue" provides an opportunity for the BJP to bolster its strength here without any negative effect elsewhere in India. If BJP were to help the creation of a Hindu-majority country in Sri Lanka, it would be an act of major historic proportions not only in the eyes of its core supporters but of all Hindus throughout the country. As for Tamil Nadu, people will be dancing in the streets with garlanded portraits of Advani and Vajpayee. BJP should seize the opportunity and act on it.
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F---- 1998-a1d